# Minnesota driving while impaired (DWI)

This document is general legal information about Minnesota's impaired driving law and the leading court decisions that interpret it. It is not legal advice, and it does not cover every situation. Impaired driving charges can carry jail time and the loss of a driver's license, and anyone facing one should speak to a lawyer.

## Sources and currency

- Minn. Stat. chapter 169A: § 169A.03 (definitions), § 169A.20 (the offenses), §§ 169A.24 to 169A.27 (first- to fourth-degree DWI), §§ 169A.275 to 169A.277 (mandatory penalties and long-term monitoring), § 169A.33 (underage drinking and driving), § 169A.35 (open bottle law), § 169A.41 (preliminary screening test), § 169A.51 (implied consent) and § 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation).
- Minn. Stat. § 171.178 (license revocation periods for DWI), and §§ 609.02 and 609.03 (definitions of misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor and their general maximum sentences).
- Text taken from the 2025 Minnesota Statutes, as published by the Office of the Revisor of Statutes at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/ and read on 2026-09-20. Laws passed in the 2026 legislative session may not be reflected. Section 169A.20 was last amended by 2023 c 63 art 4 s 28.
- Court decisions: Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions, and United States Supreme Court opinions, read in the Harvard Caselaw Access Project (https://case.law/) or on the Cornell Legal Information Institute site (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/). Every passage placed in quotation marks in the case sections below was checked against the opinion text. The summaries of holdings are my own reading of each opinion and are short. Older opinions cite the DWI statute by its former number, § 169.121, which was recodified as chapter 169A.
- Where a sentence below is my reading of how sections fit together, and not a quotation, it says so. Court decisions can be overruled or limited by later decisions, and this document notes the ones that were.

## Terminology

Chapter 169A of the Minnesota Statutes is titled "driving while impaired", and the offenses are called "driving while impaired" (DWI). I did not find the term "DUI" in the sections quoted here. Wherever this document says DWI, it means the offenses in § 169A.20.

## What is a DWI offense

Section 169A.20, subd. 1: "It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle, as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 15, within this state or on any boundary water of this state when":

1. "the person is under the influence of alcohol";
2. "the person is under the influence of a controlled substance";
3. "the person is under the influence of an intoxicating substance and the person knows or has reason to know that the substance has the capacity to cause impairment";
4. "the person is under the influence of a combination of any two or more of" those substances or of cannabis-related substances (clause 8);
5. "the person's alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more";
6. "the vehicle is a commercial motor vehicle and the person's alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the commercial motor vehicle is 0.04 or more";
7. "the person's body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II, or its metabolite", other than cannabis flower, a cannabis product, a lower-potency hemp edible, a hemp-derived consumer product, an artificially derived cannabinoid, or tetrahydrocannabinols; or
8. "the person is under the influence of cannabis flower, a cannabis product, a lower-potency hemp edible, a hemp-derived consumer product, an artificially derived cannabinoid, or tetrahydrocannabinols".

Two points follow from the wording. The offense covers being "in physical control" of the vehicle as well as driving it, and a person can be guilty under clause 1 by being under the influence even if the alcohol concentration is below 0.08.

Definitions in § 169A.03:

- "Motor vehicle" means "every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires. The term includes motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, but does not include a vehicle moved solely by human power" (subd. 15).
- "Alcohol concentration" means the number of grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine (subd. 2).

## Refusing a chemical test is a separate crime

Section 169A.20, subd. 2: "It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test: (1) of the person's breath under section 169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license); or (2) of the person's blood or urine as required by a search warrant".

Under the implied consent law, § 169A.51, subd. 1(a), a person who drives, operates or is in physical control of a motor vehicle in Minnesota "consents, subject to the provisions of sections 169A.50 to 169A.53 (implied consent law), and section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), to a chemical test of that person's blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol", and other substances, "administered at the direction of a peace officer". Subd. 1(b) says the test may be required when an officer has probable cause to believe the person was driving impaired and one of these conditions exists: the person has been lawfully arrested for DWI; the person was in an accident resulting in property damage, injury or death; the person refused the preliminary screening test; or the screening test showed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

## The preliminary screening test

Section 169A.41, subd. 1, lets a peace officer who "has reason to believe from the manner in which a person is driving, operating, controlling, or acting upon departure from a motor vehicle" that the driver may be violating the DWI law require "a sample of the driver's breath for a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the commissioner for this purpose". Subd. 2 limits its use: the result "must be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and whether to require the tests authorized in section 169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), but must not be used in any court action except" in the listed situations, which include proving that a chemical test "was properly required" and prosecutions for test refusal. My reading is that the roadside screening result is a tool for the officer's decision, not ordinary trial evidence of the alcohol concentration.

## The four degrees of DWI

Section 169A.20, subd. 3, says a person "may be sentenced as provided in" §§ 169A.24 to 169A.27. The degree depends on aggravating factors and prior history.

**Aggravating factors** (§ 169A.03, subd. 3) are:

1. "a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense";
2. "having an alcohol concentration of 0.16 or more as measured at the time, or within two hours of the time, of the offense"; or
3. "having a child under the age of 16 in the motor vehicle at the time of the offense if the child is more than 36 months younger than the offender".

A "qualified prior impaired driving incident" includes "prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired driving-related losses of license" (subd. 22).

| Degree | When it applies | Class of crime |
|---|---|---|
| First | A DWI committed within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents, or after a prior felony conviction under § 169A.24 or specified related felonies (§ 169A.24, subd. 1) | Felony: up to seven years, a fine of up to $14,000, or both, with mandatory penalties under § 169A.276 (subd. 2) |
| Second | A DWI with two or more aggravating factors; or a test refusal with one aggravating factor (§ 169A.25, subd. 1) | Gross misdemeanor; mandatory penalties in § 169A.275 and long-term monitoring in § 169A.277 "may be applicable" |
| Third | A DWI with one aggravating factor; or a test refusal (§ 169A.26, subd. 1) | Gross misdemeanor; the same mandatory penalties and monitoring "may be applicable" |
| Fourth | Any other violation of § 169A.20, subd. 1 (§ 169A.27, subd. 1) | Misdemeanor |

Maximum sentences for the lower degrees: sections 169A.25 to 169A.27 state only the class of crime. My reading is that the general limits in § 609.03, which applies when no other punishment is provided, therefore apply. Under that section a gross misdemeanor carries "imprisonment for not more than 364 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both", and a misdemeanor carries "not more than 90 days" or "not more than $1,000", or both.

## Mandatory penalties for repeat offenders

These sections add minimum penalties to the maximums above.

**Nonfelony violations, § 169A.275.**

- Second offense (a DWI within ten years of a qualified prior incident), subd. 1(a): the court "shall sentence" the person to "a minimum of 30 days of incarceration, at least 48 hours of which must be served in a local correctional facility", or "eight hours of community work service for each day less than 30 days that the person is ordered to serve in a local correctional facility". The prosecutor may move, or the court may decide on its own, to sentence without the minimum if "substantial mitigating factors exist", and the reasons must be stated on the record (subd. 1(b) and (c)). Any sentence "must include a mandatory sentence that is not subject to suspension or a stay of imposition or execution, and that includes incarceration for not less than 48 hours or at least 80 hours of community work service" (subd. 1(d)).
- Third offense (within ten years of the first of two qualified prior incidents), subd. 2(a): "a minimum of 90 days of incarceration, at least 30 days of which must be served consecutively in a local correctional facility", or an intensive supervision program that requires the person to "consecutively serve at least six days in a local correctional facility". Under subd. 2(b), not more than 60 days of the minimum may be served on home detention or intensive probation, and under subd. 2(c) the penalties "must be imposed and executed".
- Fourth offense (within ten years of the first of three qualified prior incidents), subd. 3(a): a minimum of 180 days of incarceration with at least 30 days served consecutively in a local correctional facility, or an intensive supervision program with at least six days served consecutively, or staggered sentencing with a minimum of 180 days of incarceration. Under subd. 3(b) not more than 150 days may be served on home detention or intensive probation.
- Fifth offense or more (subd. 4): a minimum of one year of incarceration with at least 60 days served consecutively in a local correctional facility, or one of the other listed programs.

**Felony violations, § 169A.276.** Subd. 1(a): a person convicted of first-degree DWI is sentenced "to imprisonment for not less than three years", and the court may add a fine of not more than $14,000. Subd. 1(b): the court "may stay execution of this mandatory sentence as provided in subdivision 2" but "may not stay imposition or adjudication of the sentence or impose a sentence that has a duration of less than three years". Subd. 1(d): after release the commissioner "shall place the person on conditional release for five years". Subd. 3: "The court may not stay the execution of the driver's license revocation provisions of section 169A.54".

**Long-term monitoring, § 169A.277.** Subd. 1 applies to a person convicted of a DWI "within ten years of the first of two or more prior impaired driving convictions", or under 19 and previously convicted, or driving while the license was canceled as inimical to public safety. Subd. 2: when the court sentences such a person "to a stayed sentence and when electronic monitoring equipment is available", the court "shall require that the person participate in a program of electronic alcohol monitoring", for "a minimum of 30 consecutive days during each year of the person's probationary period". Subd. 3 requires the person to reimburse the cost "to the extent the person is able to pay".

## Underage drinking and driving

Section 169A.33, subd. 2: "It is a crime for a person under the age of 21 years to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while consuming alcoholic beverages, or after having consumed alcoholic beverages while there is physical evidence of the consumption present in the person's body." Subd. 3 makes it a misdemeanor. Under subd. 4 the commissioner "shall suspend the person's driver's license or operating privileges for 30 days, or for 180 days if the person has previously been found to have violated subdivision 2". Under subd. 5, if the conduct also violates the DWI law, the DWI penalties apply instead of the license sanction in subd. 4.

## Open bottle law

Section 169A.35 makes three things a crime, all misdemeanors under subd. 5:

- Subd. 2: "to drink or consume an alcoholic beverage, distilled spirit, or 3.2 percent malt liquor in a motor vehicle when the vehicle is upon a street or highway".
- Subd. 3: "to have in possession, while in a private motor vehicle upon a street or highway, any bottle or receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage, distilled spirit, or 3.2 percent malt liquor that has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been partially removed". "Possession" means "either that the person had actual possession of the bottle or receptacle or that the person consciously exercised dominion and control over the bottle or receptacle" (subd. 1(4)). The offense applies to a passenger as well as the driver.
- Subd. 4: for the owner, or the driver if the owner is not present, "to keep or allow to be kept" such an opened container in the vehicle.

Subd. 6(b): subdivisions 3 and 4 "do not apply to a bottle or receptacle that is in the trunk of the vehicle if it is equipped with a trunk, or that is in another area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver and passengers if the vehicle is not equipped with a trunk. However, a utility compartment or glove compartment is deemed to be within the area occupied by the driver and passengers." Subd. 6(a) exempts passengers in a bus operated by a motor carrier of passengers, a commercial pedal vehicle with five or more passengers, and a limousine.

## Effect on the driver's license

License revocation is a separate consequence from the criminal penalty, and it can start before any conviction. Under the statutes it is imposed by "the commissioner".

Under § 169A.52, subd. 3, a test refusal leads to revocation, and under subd. 4 a test failure (an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, or the presence of a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols) leads to revocation, "as provided in section 171.178". The minimum periods in § 171.178 are:

- **Test refusal** (subd. 3): "not less than one year" if the person has no qualified prior impaired driving incidents within the past 20 years. With one or more such incidents within the past 20 years, revocation lasts "until the commissioner determines that the person used an ignition interlock device in compliance with section 171.306 for the period of time described in subdivision 8".
- **Test failure** (subd. 4), with no qualified prior incidents within 20 years: "not less than 90 days"; "not less than 180 days if the person is under 21 years of age and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of less than twice the legal limit"; and "not less than one year if the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of twice the legal limit or more". With one or more prior incidents within 20 years, revocation lasts until the ignition interlock requirement is met.
- **DWI conviction** (subd. 5), with no qualified prior incidents within 20 years, the periods are:
  - "not less than 30 days" for a conviction under § 169A.20, subd. 1;
  - "not less than 90 days" for a test refusal conviction under subd. 2;
  - "not less than 180 days if the person is under 21 years of age and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of less than twice the legal limit"; and
  - "not less than one year if the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of twice the legal limit or more".

  With one qualified prior incident within 20 years, or two or more, revocation lasts "until the commissioner determines that the person used an ignition interlock device in compliance with section 171.306". Subd. 5(b) adds time when someone was hurt: "Whenever department records show that the violation involved personal injury or death to any person, at least 90 additional days must be added to the base periods provided in paragraph (a), clause (1), items (i) to (iv)." My reading is that a first-time driver convicted of DWI who injured someone faces at least 30 days plus 90 additional days, and more if under 21 or at twice the legal limit.
- **Criminal vehicular operation or homicide conviction** (subd. 6): for the versions of those crimes that involve impairment (clauses (2) to (6)), revocation is "until the commissioner determines that the person used an ignition interlock device in compliance with section 171.306". Those crimes are covered in the reckless driving document.

For a commercial motor vehicle, § 169A.52 provides for disqualification from operating one under § 171.165, including for a test result of 0.04 or more.

## Leading cases: what counts as "physical control"

The statute reaches a person who is "in physical control" of a vehicle, not only a person who is driving. The statute does not define the phrase, and the Minnesota Supreme Court has read it broadly.

**State, Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981).** Police found David Juncewski inside a pickup truck parked on the side of a county road, seated behind and leaning against the steering wheel. The county court decided the state had not proved he was in physical control. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "Because Minnesota laws designed to prevent driving while intoxicated are to be broadly construed in the public's favor", Juncewski exercised the necessary control to have violated § 169.121. The opinion identified as an issue "Whether having the engine running is an essential element of the offense". Holding: a person can be in physical control of a vehicle without driving it, and a running engine is not required.

**Kozak v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 359 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. App. 1984).** A deputy found Joseph Kozak asleep in the driver's seat of a car parked on the highway shoulder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that he was in physical control while under the influence. It observed: "The legislature has not defined the "physical control" element of § 169.121." It also noted that in 1978 the legislature deleted the word "actual" from "actual physical control", that this indicated a desire that the statute be given the "broadest possible effect". Holding: an intoxicated person asleep at the wheel of a parked car can be in physical control, in a license revocation proceeding.

**State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1992).** Deputies found Starfield in a car with the keys not in the ignition; keys were later found in her coat pocket at the jail. The court of appeals had vacated her physical control conviction because the jury was not instructed about whether the vehicle was operable. The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction: "Other courts have held, and we agree, that the state does not need to prove operability of the motor vehicle." It added that "There may be circumstances where operability of a vehicle is relevant on the issue of whether a person has physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol", but no supplementary instruction had been requested. Holding: the state does not have to prove the vehicle could be driven.

## Leading cases: stops and roadside investigation

A DWI case often begins with a traffic stop, and a stop needs a lawful basis. The Fourth Amendment cases on traffic stops generally are in the speeding document. These cases arose from impaired driving investigations.

**Marben v. State, Department of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697 (Minn. 1980).** A trooper stopped Marben, had him do roadside coordination tests, concluded he was under the influence, arrested him, and read the implied consent advisory. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation for refusing testing and concluded that "Marben was properly arrested", so the implied consent law was validly invoked. It is an early statement that a valid arrest for DWI is the gateway to the implied consent process.

**State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. 2004).** An officer stopped Matthew Anderson for violating the move-over law, Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, but Anderson argued that he had in fact moved a lane away from the stopped emergency vehicle. The district court suppressed the impaired driving evidence because it concluded that Anderson was not actually violating the statute, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that an officer's reasonable interpretation of a statute, even if wrong, may support a stop. The Supreme Court framed the second question as whether "the officer's mistaken belief about the correct interpretation of a traffic law" could form the required objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. It reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court's decision, so the suppression order stood. The United States Supreme Court later took a different view under the Fourth Amendment in Heien v. North Carolina (2014): a reasonable mistake of law can justify a stop. See the speeding document for Heien.

**State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 2005).** Peggy Burbach was stopped for speeding, and the officer asked to search the vehicle after detecting the odor of alcohol. The Supreme Court held, under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, that "an officer's detection of the odor of alcohol coming from an adult passenger during a traffic stop does not, by itself, provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion of an open-container violation sufficient to permit an officer to expand the traffic stop by requesting to search the vehicle." Holding: the smell of alcohol on a passenger alone does not justify expanding a traffic stop into a request to search for open bottles.

**State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. App. 2005).** After a report of "something weird going down with a car in the parking lot", an officer approached Christine Lopez's vehicle with her emergency lights on and partially blocked it. The Court of Appeals held the officer's actions "created a showing of authority sufficient that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave" and so were a seizure, but upheld it as "a reasonable, limited emergency check on appellant's welfare". Holding: a welfare check that amounts to a seizure can be lawful if it is a limited emergency check.

**State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. App. 2012).** A trooper checked on a vehicle stopped on the side of an interstate in the early morning, smelled a strong odor of alcohol, and was told the driver had one drink. The trooper ordered the driver out to perform field sobriety tests. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that "the trooper's approach to Klamar's vehicle to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a seizure" and that the later investigative seizure "was reasonable at its inception and in its scope".

**Wilkes v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. App. 2010).** An officer saw a vehicle stopped in the right lane of a road around midnight. The Court of Appeals held that "appellant's driving conduct and the totality of the circumstances support a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity", and affirmed the license revocation.

**Magnuson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. App. 2005).** The Court of Appeals held that a stop based on a tip from an identified informant was lawful because "the police had reason to believe that the informant's tip was based on personal observation". It also held that the implied consent advisory did not violate due process because it did not warn that an alcohol concentration of .20 or more is an aggravating factor, since "due process does not require that the implied-consent advisory warn a driver of every possible consequence".

**Navarette v. California (U.S. 2014).** The United States Supreme Court held that a traffic stop "complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated", based on a 911 call reporting that the truck had run the caller off the road.

**Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).** The Supreme Court considered "whether a State's use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and held: "We hold that it does not."

## Leading cases: the implied consent advisory and the right to counsel

**Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).** Joy Friedman's license was revoked for refusing an implied consent breath test after she was denied a chance to consult a lawyer. The Supreme Court reversed. It held under article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution that "the right to counsel attaches at the chemical testing stage." The right is limited: "The right to counsel will be considered vindicated if the person is provided with a telephone prior to testing and given a reasonable time to contact and talk with counsel." and "If counsel cannot be contacted within a reasonable time, the person may be required to make a decision regarding testing in the absence of counsel." Holding: a driver asked to submit to a chemical test has a limited right to consult a lawyer first.

**State v. Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 2006).** Two drivers argued that the advisory did not adequately warn them of the consequences of refusing. The Supreme Court held that the advisory "violates neither federal nor state procedural due process guarantees". It relied on South Dakota v. Neville: "This warning makes it clear that a test-refusal is not a "safe harbor."" and noted that "Minnesota drivers have a limited right to counsel before testing."

**State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 2018).** Scott Hunn was asked at the jail whether he would consent to urine testing, without the deputy first reading the implied consent advisory. The Supreme Court held that "the limited right to counsel recognized by Friedman is triggered only when the implied-consent advisory is read." Holding: if the officer does not invoke the implied consent law, the Friedman right does not arise.

**State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019).** An officer obtained a search warrant for Jennifer Rosenbush's blood and read her the newer advisory for blood and urine tests, which says only that refusal is a crime. The Supreme Court held that "the limited right to counsel established in Friedman does not apply when an individual is asked to submit to a blood test pursuant to a warrant".

**Mell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 757 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. App. 2008).** The Court of Appeals held that a preliminary breath test given by a county jail as part of the routine booking process was permissible, and that the driver's right to counsel was not violated when he had two minutes to use the telephone and telephone book before the deputy required the test.

**State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 2003).** The district court had ruled that a driver denied access to an independent blood-alcohol test suffered a due process violation. The Supreme Court held that when a person charged with a related driving offense is in custody, "the person must submit to the state's test as a condition precedent to the right to an independent test." Larivee had refused to let the officer direct the state's test, so the statute gave him no right to an additional test, and the Court affirmed the court of appeals on that statutory question.

**State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 2011).** John Koppi was convicted of second-degree test refusal. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial because "the district court's instruction to the jury included an incorrect, purely subjective definition of probable cause and the instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt". Holding: the jury must be given an objective standard of probable cause for the officer's request for a test.

## Leading cases: testing and the Fourth Amendment

This is the area where the law has changed most. The United States Supreme Court's decisions changed what Minnesota could do, and the Minnesota Supreme Court responded.

**Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).** A driver was hospitalized after a crash and police had a doctor draw his blood over his objection. The Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature", so the blood test did not violate it. On the Fourth Amendment, "Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest."

**South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).** The Court held: "a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination." It also held that the warning that a driver could lose the license "made it clear that refusing the test was not a 'safe harbor,' free of adverse consequences."

**State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 2008).** After Janet Shriner caused a car accident, police took her blood without a warrant. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "The rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that defendant committed criminal vehicular operation." This single-factor rule was later rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely.

**State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009).** Jakklyn Netland argued that the criminal test refusal statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that "Netland's right to due process was not violated and that the criminal test-refusal statute did not result in an unconstitutional search". The reasoning relied on the exigency of vanishing alcohol evidence, which McNeely later undercut.

**Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).** The Court held "that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Whether an exigency exists depends on the totality of the circumstances.

**State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013).** Police took blood and urine samples from Wesley Brooks without a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that "Brooks voluntarily consented to the searches at issue in this case" under the totality of the circumstances, so no warrant was needed. It cautioned that it did not hold that Brooks consented merely because Minnesota law provides that anyone who drives in Minnesota consents to testing.

**Birchfield v. North Dakota (U.S. 2016).** The Court held: "The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving but not warrantless blood tests." The reasoning weighed the intrusion of each kind of test against the government's need.

**State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015).** William Bernard was charged with test refusal after refusing a breath test following a valid DWI arrest. The Supreme Court held that "a warrantless breath test of Bernard would have been constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement", and therefore that "the test refusal statute is a reasonable means to a permissive object and that it passes rational basis review". This result is consistent with Birchfield for breath tests.

**State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015).** Bonnie Lindquist's blood was drawn without a warrant before McNeely. The Supreme Court held that McNeely applied to her case on direct review, but that her test results did not need to be suppressed because the officer who facilitated the blood draw acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. This adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Minnesota for that situation.

**State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016).** Ryan Thompson refused warrantless blood and urine tests after a DWI arrest and was convicted of test refusal. Applying Birchfield, the Supreme Court held: "a warrantless urine test does not qualify as a search incident to a valid arrest of a suspected drunk driver", and that Thompson "cannot be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test". The test refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. A blood or urine test can still be required with a search warrant, and refusing a warranted test remains a crime under § 169A.20, subd. 2(2).

**Mitchell v. Wisconsin (U.S. 2019).** For a driver who is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, a plurality of the Court concluded that "the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant."

## How the case law fits together (my summary)

- A driver can be guilty by being in physical control of a vehicle without driving it. A running engine and an operable vehicle are not required (Juncewski, Starfield, Kozak).
- An officer needs a lawful reason to stop or seize a driver. The rules on reasonable suspicion are in the speeding document. In DWI investigations the courts have upheld stops based on driving conduct, a reliable tip, or a limited welfare check, and have refused to let the smell of alcohol on a passenger justify a search for open bottles.
- Minnesota drivers have a limited right to consult a lawyer before deciding whether to take a test under the implied consent advisory (Friedman), but only when the advisory is read and not when a warrant has been obtained (Hunn, Rosenbush).
- A breath test after a valid arrest for DWI can be required without a warrant, and refusing it can be charged as a crime (Birchfield, Bernard). Blood and urine tests generally need consent or a warrant, and a driver cannot be prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood or urine test (Thompson). Alcohol dissipating in the blood is not by itself an emergency that removes the need for a warrant (McNeely).

## What this document does not cover

- Ignition interlock program details, limited licenses, and how to reinstate a license.
- Underage drinking and driving rules beyond the summary above, boating and snowmobile rules beyond the mention of motorboats above, and detailed rules for commercial drivers.
- Field sobriety test procedure, court procedure and plea negotiations.
- Criminal vehicular operation or homicide, which are in the car accidents document and the reckless driving document.
- Court decisions not listed above. The list is a selection of leading decisions, not a complete one.