# Minnesota speeding and speed limits

This document is general legal information about Minnesota speed limits and speeding offenses (petty misdemeanor traffic violations). It is not legal advice, and it does not cover every situation.

## Sources and currency

- Minn. Stat. § 169.14 (speed restrictions), § 169.011 (definitions), § 169.89 (penalties), and §§ 609.02 and 609.03 (definitions of petty misdemeanor and misdemeanor, and their maximum sentences).
- Text taken from the 2025 Minnesota Statutes, as published by the Office of the Revisor of Statutes at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/ and read on 2026-09-20. Laws passed in the 2026 legislative session may not be reflected.
- Section 169.14 was last amended by 2024 c 127 art 3 s 49-51.
- Court decisions: Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions, and United States Supreme Court opinions, read in the Harvard Caselaw Access Project (https://case.law/) or on the Cornell Legal Information Institute site (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/). Every passage placed in quotation marks in the case sections below was checked against the opinion text. The summaries of holdings are my own reading of each opinion and are short. Older opinions cite the same statutes by earlier subdivision numbers and dates, for example Minn. Stat. § 169.14 (1982).

## The basic speed rule

Section 169.14, subd. 1, applies everywhere and at every speed: "No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions." The same subdivision adds that "Every driver is responsible for becoming and remaining aware of the actual and potential hazards then existing on the highway and must use due care in operating a vehicle." Speed must be restricted as necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance. A driver can therefore break the law while under the posted or statutory limit if the speed is not reasonable and prudent for the conditions.

## Statutory speed limits

Section 169.14, subd. 2(a), sets these speeds "where no special hazard exists". Speeds above them are "prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful". The exception is that "the speed limit within any municipality shall be a maximum limit and any speed in excess thereof shall be unlawful".

| Where | Statutory limit |
|---|---|
| Urban district | 30 mph |
| Noninterstate expressways and noninterstate freeways | 65 mph |
| Locations not otherwise specified | 55 mph |
| Interstate highways outside an urbanized area with a population greater than 50,000 | 70 mph |
| Interstate highways inside an urbanized area with a population greater than 50,000 | 65 mph |
| Alleys | 10 mph |
| Residential roadways, if adopted by the road authority | 25 mph |
| Rural residential districts, if adopted by the road authority | 35 mph |

The 25 mph and 35 mph limits are not effective unless the road authority has erected signs showing the speed limit and where the residential roadway or rural residential district begins and ends (subd. 2(b) and (c)). Other subdivisions let road authorities set limits by sign; subd. 2(d) refers to "a speed limit designated on an appropriate sign under subdivision 4, 5, 5b, 5c, or 5e".

Definitions in § 169.011:

- "Urban district" means "the territory contiguous to and including any city street or town road that is built up with structures devoted to business, industry, or dwelling houses situated at intervals of less than 100 feet for a distance of a quarter of a mile or more" (subd. 90).
- "Residential roadway" means "a city street or town road that is either (1) less than one-half mile in total length, or (2) in an area zoned exclusively for housing that is not a collector or arterial street" (subd. 64).
- "Rural residential district" is territory along a city street or town road "built up with visible dwelling houses situated at intervals averaging 300 feet or less for a distance of a quarter of a mile or more" (subd. 69a).

## Passing on a two-lane highway

Section 169.14, subd. 2a, raises the limit by ten miles per hour over the posted limit while a driver is overtaking and passing another vehicle, but only when all four conditions are met: the driver is on a two-lane highway with one lane in each direction; the posted limit is 55 mph or higher; the driver is overtaking and passing another vehicle going the same way; and the driver meets the requirements in § 169.18.

## School zones

Under subd. 5a, local authorities may set a school speed limit within a school zone. It applies "when children are present, going to or leaving school during opening or closing hours or during school recess periods". It "shall not be lower than 15 miles per hour and shall not be more than 30 miles per hour below the established speed limit". It takes effect when signs mark the beginning and end of the zone, and "Any speed in excess of such posted school speed limit is unlawful." A school zone violation carries a surcharge equal to the fine, but not less than $25 (subd. 5a(d)).

## Work zones

Under subd. 5d, on a road with an established limit of 50 mph or greater, the limit is adjusted to 45 mph in a work zone when both (1) at least one lane or part of a lane is closed in either direction and (2) workers are present. It does not apply where positive barriers separate workers from traffic, where the work zone is in place for less than 24 hours, or where the road authority has set a different limit. Road authorities can also authorize reduced work zone limits, reducing the limit by no more than 20 mph on roads with a limit of 55 mph or more.

Under subd. 6a, a person convicted of violating a work zone speed limit, or any other provision of § 169.14 while in a work zone, "shall be required to pay a fine of $300", in addition to the surcharge under § 357.021, subd. 6. Section 169.011, subd. 95, defines "work zone".

## Extreme speed and large excesses

- **Over 100 mph.** Under subd. 1a, the license of a person who violates a speed limit "by driving in excess of 100 miles per hour, is revoked for six months under section 171.17, or for a longer minimum period of time applicable under section 169A.53, 169A.54, or 171.174".
- **20 mph or more over the limit.** Under subd. 2(d), a person who drives 20 miles per hour or more over the applicable limit "is assessed an additional surcharge equal to the amount of the fine imposed for the speed violation, but not less than $25".

## How speed is proved

Section 169.14, subd. 10(a): "In any prosecution in which the rate of speed of a motor vehicle is relevant, evidence of the speed as indicated on radar or other speed-measuring device, including but not limited to a speed safety camera system, is admissible in evidence, subject to the following conditions":

1. "the officer or traffic enforcement agent under section 169.147 operating the device has sufficient training to properly operate the equipment";
2. "the officer or traffic enforcement agent testifies as to the manner in which the device was set up and operated";
3. "the device was operated with minimal distortion or interference from outside sources"; and
4. "the device was tested by an accurate and reliable external mechanism, method, or system at the time it was set up."

Subd. 10(b): records of tests kept in the regular course of a law enforcement agency's operations "are admissible in evidence without further foundation as to the results of the tests", are available to a defendant on demand, and the subdivision does not "preclude or interfere with cross examination or impeachment of evidence of the rate of speed".

A patrol car speedometer reading is admissible under subd. 9 "on a showing that a vehicle is regularly used in traffic law enforcement and that the speedometer thereon is regularly and routinely tested for accuracy and a record of the results of said tests kept on file". The reading is "prima facie evidence" of the speed, "subject to correction by the amount of error, if any, shown to exist by the test made closest in time to the time of said reading".

## Setting and changing limits

- Trunk highways: subd. 4 lets the commissioner of transportation erect signs designating a reasonable and safe limit after "an engineering and traffic investigation". The limit is "effective when such signs are erected", and speeds over it are prima facie evidence that the speed is unlawful, "except that any speed limit within any municipality shall be a maximum limit and any speed in excess thereof shall be unlawful".
- Local streets and highways not on the trunk system: subd. 5 lets local authorities request the commissioner to authorize signs after an engineering and traffic investigation.
- City streets: subd. 5h lets a city "establish speed limits for city streets under the city's jurisdiction other than the limits provided in subdivision 2 without conducting an engineering and traffic investigation". It does not apply "to town roads, county highways, or trunk highways in the city", and the city "must erect appropriate signs to display the speed limit".
- Safe road zones: subd. 5i lets the commissioner set a temporary or permanent limit in a designated safe road zone, effective on the erection of signs, and "Any speed in excess of the posted limit is unlawful."
- Minimum speeds: subd. 8 lets the commissioner post a minimum speed on a trunk highway, and "Any speeds less than the posted minimum speeds shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful."

## Reduced speed and civil cases

Section 169.14, subd. 3(a), requires a driver to "drive at an appropriate reduced speed" in listed situations, including when "approaching or passing an authorized emergency vehicle stopped with emergency lights flashing", when "approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing", "approaching and going around a curve", "approaching a hill crest", on "any narrow or winding roadway", and "when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions". Under subd. 3(b), failing to reduce speed appropriately near a stopped emergency vehicle adds a surcharge equal to the fine, but not less than $25.

Subd. 7 says the speed limits in the chapter do not "relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an accident." How a speeding violation matters in a civil injury case is covered in the car accidents document.

## Speed safety cameras

Section 169.14, subd. 13(a), applies when a violation "is identified through the use of a speed safety camera system implemented under section 169.147". The owner or lessee of the vehicle "is guilty of a petty misdemeanor and must pay a fine of" $40, or $80 "if the violation is for a speed at least 20 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit". Under subd. 13(b), a first offense gets a warning with no fine or conviction, and a second offense is eligible for diversion that includes a traffic safety course. Subd. 13(c) says that does not apply to a violation in a commercial motor vehicle or by a holder of a commercial driver's license or learner's permit. Subd. 13(d) says it "applies to violations committed on or after August 1, 2025, and before August 1, 2029". Under subd. 14(a) the owner is not liable if, for example, the vehicle was stolen, another person is convicted for the same violation, or the owner provides a sworn statement that the owner "was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation". Evidence from a camera system may be used "solely for a citation or prosecution for a violation under subdivision 13" (subd. 10(c)).

Subd. 12 makes it unlawful to "sell, offer for sale, use, or possess any radar jammer in this state", defined as a device designed or intended "to jam or interfere in any manner with a speed-measuring device operated by a peace officer".

## What kind of offense speeding is

Section 169.89, subd. 1, provides: "Unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a petty misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required by this chapter." Under subd. 2, a person charged with a petty misdemeanor "is not entitled to a jury trial", "is not subject to imprisonment" and faces "a fine of not more than $300". Section 609.02, subd. 4a, says a petty misdemeanor "does not constitute a crime".

A petty misdemeanor becomes a misdemeanor in two cases (§ 169.89, subd. 1): where the violation "is committed in a manner or under circumstances so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property", or where it is a repeat, "when preceded by two or more petty misdemeanor convictions within the immediate preceding 12-month period". A misdemeanor is a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, may be imposed (§ 609.02, subd. 3; § 609.03).

## Reckless and careless driving

Reckless driving, racing and careless driving are separate crimes under Minn. Stat. § 169.13 and are covered in a separate document. Speeding alone is a petty misdemeanor, as described above, unless § 169.89, subd. 1, raises it to a misdemeanor.

## Leading cases: speed measurements and the evidence of speeding

**State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 191 N.W.2d 428 (1971).** The Minnesota Supreme Court held that district courts may take judicial notice of the reliability of radar. This is known only through later decisions that cite it. In State v. Ali, the Court of Appeals described the rule this way: "In State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 191 N.W.2d 428 (1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that district courts could take judicial notice of the reliability of radar."

**State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. App. 2004).** Officer Johnson watched two vehicles in a 30 mph zone in Minneapolis and checked them with a laser speed-measuring device. The driver challenged his speeding conviction, arguing the laser evidence was inadmissible and the evidence insufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed: "Because we conclude that the laser evidence was properly admitted, and that the laser reading and the officer's observations are sufficient to support appellant's conviction, we affirm." It said the courts accept "the reliability of radar speedometers where there is evidence they were operated by trained personnel who have adequately tested the accuracy of the particular device by which the defendant's speed was determined", and treated laser evidence the same way. Holding: laser speed readings are admissible when the operator is trained and the device was tested, and a court need not require the officer to qualify as an expert.

**State v. Olson, 887 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. App. 2016).** An officer used a handheld laser to clock Shane Olson at 70 miles per hour in a 55 zone. Olson argued that the officer's external test proved only that the unit measured distance accurately, and that speed depends on accurate time as well as distance. Section 169.14, subd. 10(a)(4), requires an external test. The Court of Appeals held: "Because the officer's external test verified not only that the laser unit was measuring distance accurately but also implicitly verified that it was measuring time accurately, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the officer's testimony of the speed-device evidence, and we affirm." Holding: the external test required by subd. 10(a)(4) can be satisfied by a test of distance measurement that also verifies the timing.

**State v. Manley, 353 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. App. 1984).** A jury found Manley guilty of speeding under § 169.14, subd. 5, but the complaint had charged him under subd. 2, and the state was allowed to amend it after the state had rested its case. The elements of subd. 2 were "speed in excess of 55 m.p.h. or speed in excess of 30 m.p.h. in an urban district", and the elements of subd. 5 were "speed in excess of a posted speed limit which is authorized by the Commissioner of Transportation upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation". The court noted that under § 169.06, subd. 4(c), traffic-control devices are presumed to have been placed by lawful authority, so "under the amended charge, a presumption arose and the burden of going forward shifted to appellant." The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because "the amendment charged a different offense which substantially prejudiced the rights of appellant." Holding: the state cannot switch from a statutory-limit charge to a posted-limit charge after the close of its evidence.

## Leading cases: the traffic stop for speeding

An ordinary speeding ticket begins with a traffic stop. These cases set the limits on what an officer can do during and after one. Cases arising from impaired-driving investigations are in the DWI document.

**Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).** The Supreme Court held "that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." It added: "We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers."

**Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).** The Court held "only that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures." It described the extra intrusion as de minimis, and it called the officer-safety justification both legitimate and weighty.

**Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).** The Court held that Miranda warnings apply to custodial interrogation "regardless of the nature or severity of the offense", including a misdemeanor traffic offense. But it also held: "The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda." So roadside questions during an ordinary stop do not require Miranda warnings, and a driver is in custody for Miranda purposes when arrested.

**Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).** The Court held: "As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." It rejected the argument that the reasonableness of a stop depends on an officer's actual motive: "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." A stop for a real traffic violation is lawful even if the officer hoped to find something else.

**State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. 1997).** A trooper stopped Thomas George's motorcycle for an asserted illegal headlight configuration. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "Trooper Vaselaar did not have an objective legal basis for suspecting that the George was driving his motorcycle in violation of any motor vehicle law (or that he was violating any other law)". It also held that the state had failed to prove voluntary consent to the ensuing search, and it reversed and vacated the conviction. Holding: a traffic stop needs an objective legal basis, meaning a real violation or reasonable suspicion of one.

**State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004).** An officer stopped Todd Askerooth for failing to obey a stop sign, learned he had no license, ordered him out, patted him down, and confined him in the squad car before getting consent to search his van. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry." It reversed. Holding: under the Minnesota Constitution, an officer may not expand a traffic stop step by step without a justification for each step.

**Rodriguez v. United States (U.S. 2015).** The Court held that "Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." The tolerable duration of a stop is determined by its mission, "which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop", and "Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Checking the license, warrants, registration and proof of insurance are part of the mission.

**Heien v. North Carolina (U.S. 2014).** The Court held: "Because Darisse's mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop under the Fourth Amendment." An officer's reasonable mistake about what the law prohibits can support a stop. The Minnesota Supreme Court had reached the opposite result in State v. Anderson (2004), discussed in the DWI document, which concerned a stop based on a mistaken reading of the move-over law.

**Navarette v. California (U.S. 2014).** The Court held that a traffic stop "complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated", on the strength of an anonymous 911 report that the truck had run the caller off the road.

## How the case law fits together (my summary)

- To prove speed, the state generally uses a radar or laser reading or a tested speedometer. The operator must be trained and the device tested by an external method, and the driver may cross-examine (§ 169.14, subd. 10; Ali; Olson).
- A stop for a traffic violation needs probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a real violation, and the officer's private motive does not matter (Whren, Prouse, George).
- During the stop, the officer may order the driver out of the car (Mimms), may ask routine questions without Miranda warnings (Berkemer), but cannot extend the stop beyond its mission without reasonable suspicion (Rodriguez). Under the Minnesota Constitution each expansion must be justified (Askerooth).
- The charge matters. Switching from an ordinary-limit charge to a posted-limit charge after the evidence closed was reversible error in Manley.

## What this document does not cover

- The dollar amount of an ordinary speeding ticket. It is not set out in the statutes above, and this document does not state it.
- Demerit points, insurance effects, and how to contest or pay a ticket.
- Reckless driving, racing and careless driving, which have their own document.
- Local ordinances, commercial drivers, and special limits for other vehicle types.
- Other sections of chapter 169.
- Court decisions not listed above. The list is a selection of leading decisions, not a complete one.